The admissible rules of a logic are the rules under which the set of theorems of the logic is closed. In this paper a Gentzen-style framework is introduced for defining analytic proof systems that derive the admissible rules of various non-classical logics. Just as Gentzen systems for derivability treat sequents as basic objects, for admissibility, sequent rules are basic. Proof systems are defined here for the admissible rules of classes of both modal logics, including K4, S4, and GL, and intermediate logics, including Intuitionistic logic IPC, De Morgan (or Jankov) logic KC, and logics BC n (n = 1, 2, . . .) with bounded cardinality Kripke models. With minor restrictions, proof search in these systems terminates, giving decision procedures for admissibility in the corresponding logics.
Introduction
Investigation of logical systems usually concentrates on the derivability of theorems. However, it is also interesting to "move up a level" and consider which rules are admissible for the system; that is, to investigate under which rules the set of theorems is closed. Algebraically, this corresponds to the study of quasi-varieties generated by free algebras, while from a computational perspective the investigation is significant since adding further (admissible) rules to a system may improve proof search. In Classical logic CPC, such questions are trivial: admissible rules are also derivable; that is, CPC is structurally complete. However, in Intuitionistic logic IPC, and many other non-classical (e.g. modal and intermediate) logics this is no longer the case. It is therefore an interesting and significant task to provide characterizations of admissibility for these logics.
In recent years, one successful approach to characterizing admissible rules has been via bases, which may be viewed (roughly speaking) as axiomatizations for sets of rules. More precisely, a basis for admissible rules in a logic is a set of admissible rules such that adding these to the logic allows all the admissible rules to be derived. That the set of admissible rules of IPC has no finite basis but is nevertheless decidable was proved by Rybakov [14] , answering a problem originally posed by Friedman [3] . It has also been shown independently by Iemhoff [7] and Rozière [13] (confirming a conjecture of de Jongh and Visser) that such a basis is provided by the following so-called "Visser rules": [10] and for modal logics by Jerábek [11] ; proofs being based on Ghilardi's work on unification and projective approximations [4, 5] . We mention also that the basis of Visser rules given above has been used to define a first basic provability logic for IPC [17, 8] .
Although decision procedures for admissibility are described (or implicit) in the works of Rybakov and Ghilardi, a systematic presentation of analytic proof systems for deriving admissible rules has been lacking. Such a presentation is important not only for developing systems that reason directly about rules, but also for investigating relationships between admissibility in different logics, and metalogical properties such as complexity and interpolation. A first step in this direction was taken by Iemhoff in [9] where an analytic proof system is defined for deriving admissible rules of IPC based partly on an algorithm by Ghilardi for projectivity [6] . However, this system makes use of a number of inelegant syntactic divisions and semantic checks, and is unsuitable for generalization to other logics.
In this work we develop a general framework for defining Gentzen-style proof systems for admissible rules. The key idea is to give a uniform proof-theoretic characterization of admissibility by generalizing proof calculi at the theorem level. For derivability, the basic objects are typically sequents, not formulas. Similarly, for admissibility, we take the basic objects of our systems to be not rules, but sequent rules. Rules (now one level up) of these systems thus have sequent rules as premises, and a sequent rule as the conclusion. Each logical connective is characterized by four rules: the connective can occur either on the left or the right of a sequent, and the sequent itself can occur either as a premise or a conclusion of a sequent rule. Our systems also include weakening and contraction rules, and rules that allow sequents to interact: an anti-cut rule corresponding to the admissibility of cut for the logic, a projection rule reflecting the fact that derivability implies admissibility, and one or two so-called "Visser Rules" capturing key facts of admissibility in the logic.
We begin, following the work of Jerábek [11] and Ghilardi [5] , by considering a wide class of (so-called extensible) modal logics extending K4, treating as particular case studies K4, S4, and Gödel-Löb logic GL. More precisely, we obtain analytic systems for admissibility in these logics as uniform extensions of systems for derivability. The extra "Visser rules" depend on whether the logic can be characterized as transitive or intransitive. We then provide a system for the fundamental (and historically most studied) case of IPC, making essential use of theorems by Ghilardi [4] . We extend this approach to a class of intermediate logics, including De Morgan (or Jankov) logic KC and logics with bounded cardinality Kripke models BC n (n = 1, 2, . . .), by treating rules dealing with hypersequents, a natural extension of sequents introduced by Avron [1] . With minor modifications, all these systems terminate, and hence provide the basis for decision procedures for deriving admissible rules in these logics.
Preliminaries
We treat logics as consequence relations based upon propositional languages with binary connectives ∧, ∨, →, a constant ⊥, and sometimes also a modal connective 2. Other connectives are then defined as:
We denote propositional variables by p, q, . . ., formulas by A, B, . . ., and sets of formulas by Γ, Π, Σ, ∆, Θ, Ψ. Propositional variables and constants are called atoms and denoted by a, b, . . ., and formulas a → b and 2a are called atomic implications and boxed atoms respectively. We adopt the convention of writing Γ and Γ where ∅ = ⊥ and ∅ = for iterated disjunctions and conjunctions of formulas in a finite set Γ. We also write 2Γ and Γ for {2A : A ∈ Γ} and Γ ∪ 2Γ, respectively. Finally, for brevity we write {x} x∈Γ for the set {x : x ∈ Γ}, reserving ordinary brackets ( and ) for clarification.
Generalized Rules and Admissibility
Rules are usually asymmetric, having many premises but just one conclusion. However, it is convenient when considering admissibility to treat "generalized" rules having also many conclusions.
Definition 1 A generalized rule is an ordered pair of finite sets of formulas:
Intuitively, a generalized rule is admissible for a logic L if whenever a substitution makes all the premises theorems of L, then it makes one of the conclusions a theorem. More precisely:
In developing proof systems for derivability in a logic it is helpful to consider sequents, which in this context, we define and interpret as follows:
Definition 4 A sequent S is an ordered pair of finite sets of formulas:
where:
Similarly, for admissibility, rather than deal with rules involving only formulas, we consider sequent rules. These are represented as "implications" between multisets of sequents using the symbol as follows:
Definition 5 A generalized sequent rule (gs-rule for short) R is an ordered pair of multisets of sequents:
Note that unlike generalized rules, gs-rules consist of multisets, not sets, of premises and conclusions, denoted by the variables G, H. However, crucially:
Hence a proof system for the admissibility of gs-rules is also a proof system for the admissibility of generalized rules.
Rules (now at the next level up) for gs-rules consist of a set of premises R 1 , . . . , R n , which we often write as
, and a conclusion R; rules with no premises being called initial gs-rules. Such rules are sound with respect to a logic L if whenever
Example 6
As an illustration of these ideas, consider the disjunction property, which can be written as the generalized rule p ∨ q / p, q. Clearly, this rule is Ladmissible iff the gs-rule:
is L-admissible. Observe now that if σ is an IPC-unifier for p ∨ q, i.e. IPC (σp) ∨ (σq), then σ must be an IPC-unifier for p or q, i.e. either IPC (σp) or IPC (σq). However, this does not hold for CPC. For example, let σ(p) = p and σ(q) = ¬p; plainly CPC p ∨ ¬p, but CPC p and CPC ¬p.
Projectivity and the Extension Property
Admissibility and derivability do not coincide in general for non-classical logics. However, Ghilardi [4, 5] has identified classes of so-called "projective" formulas where if A is projective, then the relationship "
Definition 7 Let L be a logic and A a formula. A is L-projective if there exists a substitution σ, called an L-projective unifier for A, such that:
Lemma 8 Let L be an intermediate logic or a normal modal logic: 
Proof.
(a) The right-to-left direction is immediate. For the other direction, let
there exists an L-projective unifier σ of A, such that L σB for some B ∈ ∆. But using the Leibniz property for L and the fact that σ is an 
What makes projective formulas particularly interesting (and useful) is the fact that for certain logics they can also be characterized in terms of Kripke models. Theorem 12 (Ghilardi [4] ) A formula is IPC-projective iff its class of Kripke models has the extension property.
Example 13 Using this definition it is not difficult to see that the formulas p, ¬p, ¬p → (q ∧ r) or p → A are IPC-projective (e.g. for p and ¬p the constant substitutions and ⊥ are IPC-projective unifiers), while ¬p → (q ∨ r) and ¬p ∨ ¬¬p are not. In particular, the antecedents of the atomic version of the Visser rules:
are not IPC-projective, while every one of the disjuncts of the conclusion is.
Note moreover that De Jongh and Bezhanishvili have showed that for any finite set of propositional variables there are only finitely many IPC-projective formulas containing only atoms in the given set, and have given a characterization of the IPC-projective formulas in one (De Jongh in [? ]) and two variables.
Ghilardi [5] has also extended this characterization to a wide range of modal logics (we follow here the terminology of [11] ).
Definition 14
Let K k denote the Kripke model K restricted to the domain {l :
Definition 15 For frames F 1 , . . . , F n , denote by (ΣF j ) i and (ΣF j ) r , the frames obtained by adding, respectively, one irreflexive and one reflexive node below all nodes in the frame.
Definition 16
A normal modal logic L has the finite model property if every refutable formula is refutable on a finite L-frame. L is extensible if it is a normal extension of K4 with the finite model property such that for all finite sets of L-frames F 1 , . . . , F n the frame (ΣF j )
i is an L-frame unless L is reflexive, and (ΣF j ) r is an L-frame unless L is irreflexive.
Definition 17 A class of finite modal models K has the modal extension property if for every model K, if K k ∈ K for all k not in the root of K, then there is a variant of K in K.
Theorem 18 (Ghilardi [5] ) For every normal extension L of K4 with the finite model property a formula is L-projective iff its class of L-models has the modal extension property.
Example 19 Using this theorem it is not difficult to see that for each extensible modal logic L, the formulas p, ¬p, p → A are L-projective, while e.g. p → (q ∨ r) is not. In particular, the antecedents of the atomic versions of the Visser rules for the modal case:
are not L-projective, while every element of the conclusion is.
Modal Logics
In this section we define uniform Gentzen-style calculi for deriving admissible gsrules of extensible modal logics. We begin by introducing systems for the paradigmatic cases K4, S4, and GL. We then use these systems to show that any calculus for derivability in an extensible modal logic can be extended to a proof system for admissibility in that logic.
Proof Systems
We construct calculi for admissibility in much the same way as for derivability: we give rules for connectives on the left and right of sequents. The difference here is that the sequents themselves occur either on the left or the right; that is, as premises or conclusions of a gs-rule, doubling the number of rules required. For sequents occurring on the right, we adapt rules from calculi for derivability by adding variables G and H standing for arbitrary multisets of sequents. For sequents occurring on the left, we make use of invertibility properties of the rules on the right. Calculi are then completed by adding structural rules and various rules that allow sequents to interact.
We define the following core set of rules for extensible modal logics:
Definition 20 (Core Modal Rules)
Initial GS-Rules
where in (2 ⇒) and (⇒ 2) , A is non-atomic and p does not occur in G, H, Γ, ∆, A.
Structural Rules
Anti-Cut and Projection Rules
where
We now extend this core set to obtain proof systems for admissibility in the paradigmatic cases of K4, S4, and GL.
Definition 21 GAK4 consists of the core modal rules plus:
and the Visser Rules:
where (Γ ≡ 2Π ⇒ ∆) denotes any set of sequents X such that:
Note that in particular, taking Σ = Z and Ψ = ∆ in (V r ), we obtain the rule:
Definition 22 GAS4 consists of the core modal rules plus (V r ), (2) K4 , and:
Definition 23 GAGL consists of the core modal rules plus (V i ) and:
Some explanation is required. First note that weakening and contraction are "built in" to the right logical rules (taken from [15] ). This is not strictly necessary. In fact, any calculus for derivability in the logic can be used as a template for the right logical rules. However, for ∧, ∨, and →, the rules given here are easily "inverted" to obtain corresponding rules on the left; that is, by replacing the conclusion of the original sequent rule with the premises of that rule. This approach fails in the case of the (non-invertible) modal rules. Instead the rules (2 ⇒) and (⇒ 2) decompose modal formulas on the left by replacing the formula A in 2A by a new propositional variable p. The soundness of these rules follows from the fact that any substitution for the conclusion can be extended (since p does not occur there) by subsituting A for p.
The structural rules permit weakening and contraction of sequents occurring as premises and conclusions of sequent rules. The "Projection Rule" (P J) allows sequents on the left to be used as modal implications on the right, corresponding to the fact that derivability implies admissibility.
5
Example 24 It is easy to see that any gs-rule containing the same sequent on both sides (i.e. as a premise and as a conclusion) is derivable using (P J). Indeed, generalizing a little, the following gs-rule may be taken as a useful derived initial gs-rule:
Just observe that the following gs-rule:
is derivable using the initial gs-rules and right logical rules, and hence that (SID) is derivable using (P J).
The "Anti-Cut Rule" (AC) corresponds directly to the fact that the usual cut rule is admissible in the logic. Observe however that, unlike cut, (AC), and indeed all the rules except (⇒ 2) and (2 ⇒) , have the subformula property. That is, every formula occurring in a premise of such a rule occurs as a subformula of a formula in the conclusion. Note, moreover, that a suitable cut rule for admissibility would be of the form:
However, rather than eliminate (CU T ) syntactically, here we obtain the admissibility of the rule indirectly via a (semantic) completeness proof.
Example 25 Consider the following cut rule:
The gs-rule version is derivable as follows:
The "Visser Rules" (V i ) and (V r ) are a little harder to understand, corresponding to the rules (A • ) and (A • ), respectively, given by Jerabek in [11] (see Example 19).
Example 26 For non-reflexive logics the gs-rule versions of (A • ) are derived using (V i ) as follows:
For non-irreflexive logics, we can use (V r ) to show:
, it is hence sufficient that for any H, ∆, and Γ, we can derive
H is derivable, then we have:
Extensible modal logics possessing a natural sequent calculus for derivability provide the most elegant examples of our systems for admissibility. However, all that we really require for the rules on the right is that they provide a sound and complete method for establishing derivability in the logic at hand. We can then expand this calculus with the core modal rules, plus (V i ) if the logic is not reflexive, and (V r ) if the logic is not irreflexive. The result is a calculus which, as we show in the next section, is sound and complete for admissibility in the logic.
Definition 27 Let L be an extensible modal logic. A calculus GAL is L-fitting if:
(1) GAL extends the core modal rules.
Soundness and Completeness
We first show that the core modal rules and (where appropriate) the Visser rules are sound for extensible modal logics.
Proposition 28 Let L be an extensible modal logic.
Proof. (a)
The initial gs-rules and right logical rules (taken from a calculus for CPC in [15] ) are clearly L-sound. For the left logical rules for ∧, ∨, and →, soundness follows directly from the CPC-invertibility of the rules on the right. For (2 ⇒) , suppose that the premise is L-admissible and let σ be an L-unifier for I(S) for all S ∈ G and I(Γ, 2A ⇒ ∆). Since p does not occur in G, H, Γ, ∆, A we can extend σ by mapping p to A. It follows that σ is an L-unifier for I(Γ, 2p ⇒ ∆) and I(A ⇒ p). Hence, by the admissibility of the premise, σ is an L-unifier for some S ∈ H as required. The argument for (2 ⇒) is very similar.
It is easy to see that the structural rules are L-sound. For (AC), suppose that the premise is L-admissible. Let σ be an L-unifier for I(S) for all S ∈ G, I(Γ, A ⇒ ∆), and I(Π ⇒ A, Σ). By the L-admissibility of the cut rule for L, we get that σ is an L-unifier for I(Γ, Π ⇒ Σ, ∆) and the result follows using the L-admissibility of the premise. For (P J), suppose that the premise is L-admissible and that σ is an L-unifier for I(S ) for all S ∈ G and I(S). It follows that σ is an L-unifier either for I(Γ, I(S) ⇒ ∆) or for I(S ) for some S ∈ H. In the latter case we are done.
In the former case, since σ is an L-unifier for I(S) it is an L-unifier for I(S), and hence also for I(Γ ⇒ ∆). Since there is no L-unifier for the empty sequent ⇒, we have (Γ ⇒ ∆) ∈ H and we are done.
(b) For (V i ), suppose that all the premises are L-admissible. Let σ be an L-unifier for I(S) for all S ∈ G and I(2Γ ⇒ 2∆). If σ is a L-unifier for I( Γ ⇒ A) for some A ∈ ∆, then we are done using the admissibility of the premises. Otherwise let K A be a L-model refuting σ(I( Γ ⇒ A)) for each A ∈ ∆. They exist because L has the finite model property. The fact that L is extensible and not reflexive implies that
i is also an L-model. But σ(I(2Γ ⇒ 2∆)) is refuted at the root of this model, a contradiction.
Let σ be an L-unifier for G and Γ ≡ 2Π ⇒ 2∆, recalling that the latter denotes a set of sequents X such that:
Arguing by contradiction, suppose that σ is not an L-unifier for H. Hence σ is not a unifier for
Because of the reflexivity of r and since each K A forces σ( Γ), we have r σ(Σ) but r σ( ((Γ ∪ 2Π) − Σ) 2∆), contradicting the fact that σ(X). 2
In particular, using the fact that the rules on the right for GAK4, GAS4, and GAL are sound and complete for K4, S4, and GL, respectively (see e.g. [? ] for references), we obtain:
Our completeness proof consists of several stages. First we show completeness for a restricted class of gs-rules: L-derivable gs-rules with at most one sequent on the right. The idea being (to look ahead a little) to show eventually that all L-admissible gs-rules are GAL-derivable from gs-rules in this class.
Lemma 30 Let L be an extensible modal logic and let
But then using the modal deduction theorem (see e.g. [? ] for details):
Hence L Γ, { I(S)} S∈G ⇒ ∆, and since GAL is L-fitting:
So by repeated applications of (P J), GAL G H as required. 2
The next step is to show that the left logical rules are invertible. Since, each of these rules has fewer connectives in its premise than its conclusion, it then follows that the question of the admissibility of gs-rules can be restricted to a particular subclass.
Lemma 31 Let L be an extensible modal logic. The left logical rules are L-invertible.
Proof.
The cases for ∧, ∨, and → follow from the L-soundness of the left logical rules. As an example, we consider (⇒ ∧) . Suppose that the conclusion is L-admissible and let σ be a unifier for I(Γ ⇒ A, ∆), I(Γ ⇒ B, ∆), and
It follows therefore by the admissibility of the conclusion, that σ is a unifier for I(S) for some S ∈ H. For (2 ⇒) , suppose that the conclusion is L-admissible and let σ be an L-unifier for I(Γ, 2p ⇒ ∆), I(A ⇒ p), and I(S) for all S ∈ G. Since L is a normal modal logic, σ is an L-unifier for I(2A ⇒ 2p). Hence by the L-admissibility of cut, σ is an L-unifier for I(Γ, 2A ⇒ ∆) and the result follows using the L-admissibility of the conclusion. The case of (⇒ 2) is very similar. 2
Definition 32 A gs-rule G H is modal-irreducible if the sequents in G contain only atoms and boxed atoms.
Definition 33
We define the following measures:
• c(q) = 1 for all propositional variables q, and c(# (A 1 , . . . , A n )) = c(A 1 ) + . . . + c(A n ) + 1 for formulas A 1 , . . . , A n , and each connective # with arity n.
• mmc(G H) is the multiset {mc(S) : S ∈ G ∪ H} for a gs-rule G H.
Definition 34
For multisets α, β of integers: < m is the transitive closure of < 1 , where α < 1 β if α is obtained by replacing an element n of β by finitely many (possibly 0) copies of m for some m < n. Similarly, for multisets φ, ψ of multisets of integers, < mm is the transitive closure of < 2 , where φ < 2 ψ if φ is obtained by replacing an element α of ψ by finitely many (possibly 0) copies of β for some β < m α.
Theorem 35 (Dershowitz and Manna [12] ) < m and < mm are well-orderings.
Lemma 36 Let L be an extensible modal logic. Every L-admissible gs-rule is derivable from an L-admissible modal irreducible gs-rule using the left logical rules. Proof . Since < mm is a well-ordering, we can prove the lemma by induction on mmc(R) where R is an L-admissible gs-rule. If R is modal-irreducible, then we are done. Otherwise there is an instance of a left logical rule R / R such that mmc(R ) < mmc(R), where by L-invertibility R is an L-admissible gs-rule. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, R is GAL-derivable from an L-admissible modal irreducible gs-rule, and then clearly so also is R. 2
As a consequence of the previous lemma, it is sufficient to establish completeness for modal irreducible L-admissible gs-rules. Intuitively, we do this (working upwards) by applying the anti-cut rule (AC) and the Visser rules (V i ) and (V r ) exhaustively, using structural rules at each step to ensure that sequents occurring in the conclusion occur also in the premises. Since these rules have the subformula property, the number of possible sequents obtained in this way is finite and the process terminates with gs-rules which we call L-modal full.
Definition 37 Let R be a rule with premises G i H i for i = 1 . . . n, and conclusion G H. An application of R is non-looping if for each i = 1 . . . n there exists either S ∈ G i such that S ∈ G or S ∈ H i such that S ∈ H.
Definition 38 A gs-rule R is full with respect to a set of rules X if there is no nonlooping application of a rule in X to R. For an extensible modal logic L we will say that a gs-rule is L-modal full if it is modal-irreducible and full with respect to
Observe that L-modal fullness is a property that only depends on the left hand side G of a gs-rule G H.
Lemma 39 Let L be an extensible modal logic. Every L-admissible gs-rule is derivable from a set of L-modal full L-admissible gs-rules. Proof . By Lemma 36 we can restrict our attention to L-admissible modal irreducible gs-rules R = G H, assuming without loss of generality that G and H contain no repeated elements. We proceed by induction on n(R) = 2M − (|G| + |H|) where M is the number of different sequents possible containing subformulas of formulas occurring in R. If n(R) = 0, then R must be L-modal full since any application of a rule will be looping. If R is not L-modal full, then there exists an instance of (AC), (V i ), or (V r ) with conclusion G H, such that for each premise G H , G ⊆ G, or H ⊆ H. Clearly G H is GAL-derivable from L-admissible premises of the form R = G, G H , H using also (C) . But n(R ) < n(R).
Hence by the induction hypothesis, each R is derivable from a set of L-modal full L-admissible gs-rules, and the result follows. 2
We use these lemmas to show that if an L-admissible full gs-rule G H is inconsistent or the formula S∈G I(S) is L-projective, then is G H is GAL-derivable. We then deal with the case where A is consistent and not L-projective and show, using Ghilardi's characterization of L-projective formulas, that this case cannot occur by deriving a contradiction.
Theorem 40 Let L be an extensible modal logic, and let GAL be L-fitting. Then
The right-to-left direction follows from the definition of L-fitting. For the other direction, by Lemma 39 it is sufficient to assume that R = G H is a modalfull L-admissible gs-rule. Let C = S∈G I(S). If C is inconsistent, then L G , and if C is L-projective, then using Lemma 8 (a), L G S for some S ∈ H. In both cases, by Lemma 30 and (W ), GAL G H.
Hence assume that C is consistent and not L-projective. We use Theorem 18 of Ghilardi, which tells us that C does not have the L-extension property, to obtain a non-empty L-model K such that K k C for all k not in the root of K, and such that every variant of K refutes C. We write K A or A ∈ K if K k A for all k not in the root of K. Let M 1 , . . . , M k be the variants of K, and let S 1 , . . . , S k be the sequents in G for which M i S i , where
Note that Γ i and ∆ i contain only atoms and boxed atoms by the fullness of G H. We distinguish by cases according to whether K is reflexive or not, recalling that in some logics this is possible and others not.
Irreflexive case. First, suppose K is irreflexive. Observe that in this case
Let:
We show that A is a tautology: consider a valuation v on atoms occuring in C, and define a variant M of K by defining:
Suppose that M is the variant M i . It is not difficult to see that v(p) = 1 for p ∈ Γ i and v(p) = 0 for p ∈ ∆ i ; i.e. v(A i ) = 1. So A is a tautology, and the formula corresponding to the negation of A, and swapping literals (i.e. p goes to ¬p and vice versa):
is inconsistent (swapping literals is not necessary but simplifies the reasoning that follows). Therefore, there exists a resolution refutation starting with the clauses:
that ends in the empty clause ∅. Let Θ ∪ Ψ be any clause in the refutation, where Θ contains only atoms and Ψ contains only negated atoms. Define Ψ = {p : ¬p ∈ Ψ }. Then, since R is full, we can show inductively, using (AC) and (1) for the base case, that there exists (2Γ, Θ ⇒ Ψ, 2∆) ∈ G such that:
Now consider the empty clause ∅, and its corresponding sequent in G of the form 2Γ ⇒ 2∆. The rule (V i ) implies that Γ ⇒ q ∈ G for some q ∈ ∆, and hence it follows, as
Reflexive case. Instead of (V i ), the rule (V r ) plays a crucial role here. Recall that we denote the set {A | K A} by K and that
In order to apply resolution refutations as in the irreflexive case above, we associate, for p ∈ K , new atoms l p with expressions (p ∧ 2p). Define A i to be the formula:
We show that A = A i is a tautology. Consider a valuation v and define a variant M of K via:
Suppose M is the variant M i . This implies that for p ∈ K , p ∈ Γ i implies v(p) = 1, and p ∈ ∆ i implies v(p) = 0. Observe the following relation between atoms l p and expressions (p ∧ 2p):
By (3) we have that for p ∈ K , p ∈ Γ i or 2p ∈ Γ i implies v(l p ) = 1 and p ∈ ∆ i or 2p ∈ ∆ i implies v(l p ) = 0. Therefore, v(A i ) = 1, and thus A is a tautology.
Hence the formula:
¬l p equivalent to ¬A, swapping literals, is inconsistent. So there exists a resolution refutation of:
that ends in the empty clause ∅. Let ΘΠ ∪ ΨΣ be any clause in the refutation, where Θ contains only atoms not in K , Π contains only atoms of the form l q , Ψ contains only negated atoms not in K , and Σ contains only negated atoms of the form ¬l q . Observe that no clause contains both p and l p . Also, the existence of an atom l p implies p ∈ K , and p ∈ K implies that there is no l p . Observe that for the input clauses no variable appears both in the succedent and the antecedent of a sequent. As usual, we assume that no clause in the refutation contains both an atom and its negation. First, some definitions:
For a clause R, let:
First we sketch the idea of the proof by an example. The reasoning is similar to the irreflexive case, but more complicated. The idea is to associate with every clause a set of sequents in such a way that for the empty clause the associated set includes Γ ≡ 2Γ ⇒ 2∆ to which we can apply (V r ) and thereby obtain a contradiction. The exact argument in this last step will be given at the end of the proof. Note the similarity with the irreflexive case. What makes this part of the proof more complicated is that we cannot, as in that case, associate sequents with clauses, but rather sets of sequents with clauses.
Suppose that the input clauses are:
Moreover, suppose that in this example, if q ∈ Γ i ∩ K , then 2q ∈ Γ i , and vice versa, and similarly for ∆ i . This is not a necessary assumption, but just facilitates the reasoning below. Thus the initial sequents are p, q ⇒ r, 2r q ⇒ p, r, 2r ⇒ q, 2q, r, 2r r ⇒ .
Observe that this implies that p ∈ K c . Following the resolution refutation, we see that the cut on p can be mimicked at the sequent level using the rule (AC), since it implies that q ⇒ r, 2r ∈ G. However, the cuts on l q and l r cannot be mimicked at the sequent level. Instead, we keep track of the set P c R of all atoms of the form l x or ¬l x that do not occur in R (because they have been cut away already, or were never there), and note that for each
, and ∆ ⊆ K c such that Γ, Π ⇒ Θ, Σ, 2∆ ∈ G. This property will be denoted by V (R, Z, G).
In our example the fact that this property holds can be shown as follows. For the input clauses R with associated sequents Γ ⇒ ∆ this is immediate since Γ ⊆ P + R and ∆ ⊆ P − R . For the other clauses we choose the sequents as follows.
We leave it to the reader to verify that the associated sequents have the desired form and are elements of G. For example, for R = {l q } and Z = ∅, the sequent q ⇒ r, 2r has the desired form since q, 2q ∈ R + and r, 2r ∈ P c R − Z. That it is an element of G follows from the fact that G is full and contains the sequents p, q ⇒ r, 2r and q ⇒ p, r, 2r. Thus by (AC) it also contains q ⇒ r, 2r.
As the example shows, there is not one particular sequent corresponding to a clause. Instead, for each of the subsets Z of P c R , we have a sequent in G which is a witness of V (R, Z, G). The argument showing that the fact that V (∅, Z, G) holds for all Z ⊆ P c ∅ leads to a contradiction, will be given at the end of the proof.
Define:
Claim 1 For every clause R in the resolution refutation U (R, G) holds.
Proof of the Claim. For the initial clauses R = ΘΠ ∪ ΨΣ this is straightforward as they can be divided as Γ i ⇒ Σ i , 2Θ i , where
Cuts on p. For the induction step, first consider a cut on an atom p, with input clauses R ∪ {p} and R ∪ {¬p}, and conclusion R ∪ R . Therefore, consider Z ⊆ P
We will leave out all the ∆'s in the argument as they play no role in it. Consider
observe that Y and Y are of the form W . Therefore, by the induction hypothesis there are sequents Γ, Π, p ⇒ Θ, Σ and
R − Y , and similarly for the second sequent. The case that p does not occur in one or both of the sequents can be treated in the same way. By (AC) the sequent Γ, Γ , Π, Π ⇒ Θ, Θ , Σ, Σ ∈ G. We will take for S this sequent, and show how we have to partition it in order to obtain (5). Define
We have to show that they satisfy (5) , and that ΓΓ ΠΠ = Γ Π and ΘΘ ΣΣ = Σ Σ . For the first part, note that no clause in the refutation contains both an atom and its negation, which implies that Γ Π and Θ Σ do not contain p. Therefore, Cuts on l p . For a cut on l p the input clauses are R ∪ {l p } R ∪ {¬l p } and the conclusion is R ∪ R . We have to show that U (R ∪ R , G). Therefore,
We distinguish the two cases p, 2p ∈ X, and p, 2p ∈ X. Observe that since X is of the form Z these are the only two cases that can occur. We treat the first case, the second case is similar. Consider
Note that Y is of the form W . Therefore, by the induction hypothesis there is a sequent
Consider the following partition of S:
, and ∆ = ∆. We have to show that ΓΠΘΣ satisfy (6).
and that it is indeed a partition of S, i.e.
For (7), that Γ ⊆ X is clear. For
This finishes the proof of (7). For (8) , that ΓΠ = Γ Π is easy to see. For ΘΣ = Θ Σ , observe that Θ ∩ P To finish the proof of the theorem, consider the empty clause ∅, and observe that P
Since also K Γ, K q follows, contradicting K q, which follows from ∆ ⊆ K c . This finishes the proof of the theorem. 2
In combination with Corollary, we obtain in particular soundness and completeness results for GAK4, GAS4, and GAL.
Intuitionistic Logic
In this section we turn our attention to the historically most significant case of Intuitionistic Logic IPC, proceeding in much the same way as for modal logics. Namely, we start with a calculus for derivability (taken from [15] ) for the right logical rules, and use invertibility properties to obtain left logical rules.
Definition 42 (GAI)
GAI is evidently very similar to the calculi for extensible modal logics, the main differences being changes in the rules for implication, a different Visser Rule, and the addition of the implication rule.
Example 43 Consider the Kreisel-Putnam rule ¬A → (B ∨ C) / (¬A → B) ∨ (¬A → C) which is IPC-admissible but not IPC-derivable. This can be written in gs-rule format as:
We will construct a proof of this in GAI. First, proceeding backwards, we apply (→) , (W ) , and (C) to get:
We now apply the Visser rule (V ) to the first sequent on the left. Observe that Γ here contains just one implication ¬A, and Γ ∆ is in this case just ∅ with Γ ∅ = ¬A. Hence we get the following premises to be proved:
(1) is derivable as follows:
(2) and (3) are derivable simply by applying (⇒→) to the appropriate disjunct and (SID), while (4) is just an instance of (SID).
The proof of soundness for GAI with respect to IPC-admissibility proceeds similarly to Lemma 28.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that each rule of GAI is IPC-sound, concentrating just on those cases different to Lemma 28. For (→⇒) i , let σ be a unifier for I(S) for all S ∈ G and I(Γ, A → B ⇒ ∆). Since p and q do not occur in the conclusion of the rule, we can extend σ with σ(p) = σ(A) and σ(q) = σ(B). It follows immediately that σ is a unifier for I(Γ, p → q ⇒ ∆), I(p ⇒ A), and I(B ⇒ q). Hence, if the premise is IPC-admissible, then σ is a unifier for I(S) for some S ∈ H as required. The case of the rule (⇒→) follows a similar pattern.
For (V ), suppose that σ is a unifier for I(S) for all S ∈ G and I(Γ ⇒ ∆), and let ∆ = {A 1 , . . . , A n }. Using the right set of premises, σ is either a unifier for some S ∈ H or for I(Γ Π , Π ⇒ ∆) for all Π ⊆ Γ ∆ . In the first case we are done, so assume the latter. It suffices now by the left set of premises to show that σ is a unifier for I(Γ ⇒ A i ) for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Suppose, arguing contrapositively, that this is not the case. Then there exist countermodels K 1 , . . . , K n such that K i σ( Γ) and
. Hence for all B ∈ Π it follows that K σ(B), and so
We now need a series of lemmas corresponding to those used in the modal case.
First we have, exactly as in Lemma 30 (except replacing the application of the modal deduction theorem with the usual deduction theorem), that IPC-derivable gs-rules with at most one sequent on the right are GAI-derivable.
We then establish that IPC-admissible rules are GAI-derivable from IPC-admissible rules that are full (recalling Definition 38 for the definition of fullness) with respect to (V ), (→) , and (AC). Below, we prove just the invertibility step, proofs for the second and third lemmas proceeding in exactly the same way as Lemmas 36 and 39.
Lemma 46
The left logical rules of GAI are invertible.
Proof. The cases for ∧ and ∨ are straightforward. For (→⇒) i , assume that σ is a unifier for I(S) for all S ∈ G, I(Γ, p → q ⇒ ∆), I(p ⇒ A), and I(B ⇒ q). Since IPC I(A, A → B ⇒ B) it follows that σ is a unifier for I(p, A → B ⇒ q), and hence for I(A → B ⇒ p → q). So by cut-admissibility for IPC, σ is a unifier for I(Γ, A → B ⇒ ∆), and hence, by the IPC-admissibility of the conclusion, for I(S) for some S ∈ H. The case of (⇒→) i is similar. 2
Definition 47 A gs-rule G H is implication-irreducible if every sequent in G contains only atoms on the right and atoms and atomic implications on the left.
Lemma 48 Every IPC-admissible gs-rule is GAI-derivable from an IPC-admissible implication-irreducible gs-rule.
Lemma 49 Admissible gs-rules are GAI-derivable from IPC-admissible gs-rules that are full with respect to (V ), (→) , and (AC).
We now use Ghilardi's characterization of IPC-projective formulas to establish completeness for GAI. First, however, we give a technical lemma showing that a crucial property of gs-rules is preserved from premise to conclusion by the rule (AC). For convenience, we define the following conditions for multisets of gs-rules G and sets of formulas I:
Definition 50 Recall that
Let G be a multiset of sequents, Γ ⇒ ∆ a sequent, and I a set of formulas:
First, assume p ∈ I. By the hypothesis and (9), there are Γ ⊆ Γ I ∪ I, Π ⊆ Π I ∪ I, ∆ ⊆ ∆, and Σ ⊆ Σ such that (Γ , p ⇒ ∆ ) ∈ G and (Π ⇒ p, Σ ) ∈ G. Whence also (Γ , Π ⇒ Σ , ∆ ) ∈ G by fullness, and we are done.
Second, assume p ∈ I. By the hypothesis and (9), we have Γ ⊆ Γ I ∪ I and ∆ ⊆ ∆ such that (Γ ⇒ ∆ ) ∈ G, and we are done. 2
Proof. The right to left direction has been proved above. For the other direction, it is sufficient using Lemma 49 to assume that R = G H is an IPC-admissible gs-rule full with respect to (AC), (→) , and (V ). Let C = S∈G I(S). If C is inconsistent, then IPC G , and if C is IPC-projective, then using Lemma 8 (a), IPC G S for some S ∈ H. Hence in both cases, by Lemma 45 and (W ), GAI G H.
Hence assume that C is consistent and not IPC-projective. We use Ghilardi's key result, Theorem 12, which tells us that C does not have the extension property, to show that R is GAI-derivable. Unpacking the definition of the extension property, we consider the set of Kripke models K for C, and have a model K ∈ K such that K C and every variant of K refutes C. We can assume that K has at least one node as otherwise K would have one node, and, since C is consistent, we know that for such a classical model there is a variant that forces C. Let M 1 , . . . , M k be all the possible variants of K and let C 1 , . . . , C k be the sequents of G such that M i C i . Observe that we can assume for each i that:
For suppose that this is not possible. Then p → q ∈ Γ i and p ∈ ∆ i . But since M i Γ i and M i ∆ i , it follows that M i p → q, and hence either M i p or M i q. This means that either
But since R is full with respect to (→) , both of these sequents are in G, and can replace Γ i ⇒ ∆ i , a contradiction. Now we define the set of atoms: P = {p : p occurs in C and K p}. Let at(Γ) denote the set of atoms that are elements of Γ. Note that at(Γ i ) ⊆ P for all i = 1 . . . k. Define for i = 1 . . . k:
We show that A = def k i=1 A i is a classical tautology. Since K p for all p ∈ P , given a classical valuation v on P , we can consider the variant of K defined at the root by:
where M is M j for some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Observe that M p and hence v(p) = 1 for all p ∈ at(Γ j ), and M p and hence v(p) = 0 for all p ∈ ∆ j . Thus v(A j ) = 1. Hence A is a tautology and the following formula, equivalent to the negation of A, is inconsistent:
Hence there exists a resolution refutation starting with the clauses:
that ends in the empty clause ∅.
Let Θ ∪ Ψ be a clause in the refutation, where Θ contains only atoms and Ψ contains only negated atoms. Define Ψ = {p : ¬p ∈ Ψ }. Then, since R is full with respect to (AC), there exists (Γ, Θ ⇒ Ψ, ∆) ∈ G such that ∆ ∩ P = ∅, Γ ∩ P = ∅, and K Γ. Moreover, since it holds by (10) for Γ i ⇒ ∆ i for i = 1 . . . k, inductively by multiple applications of Lemma 51:
Hence in particular for the empty clause ∅: (Γ ⇒ ∆) ∈ G where ∆ contains only atoms not in P , Γ contains only implicational formulas, and K Γ. Since R is full with respect to (V ), either (Γ ⇒ q) ∈ G for some q ∈ ∆, or (Γ Π , Π ⇒ ∆) ∈ H for some Π ⊆ Γ ∆ . In the first case, we get that K Γ → q, since K C. But K Γ so it follows that K q, which implies q ∈ P , a contradiction. In the second case, using (11) , there exists (Γ ⇒ ∆ ) ∈ G for some Γ ⊆ Γ Π ∪ Π and some ∆ ⊆ ∆.
, it follows by Lemma 45 that GAI (Γ ⇒ ∆ ) (Γ Π , Π ⇒ ∆) and hence by (W ) and (W ) that GAI R as required. 2
Intermediate Logics
In this section we consider intermediate logics, recalling the result of [10] that if the Visser rules are admissible for an intermediate logic, then they form a basis for the admissible rules of that logic. In some cases, such as Gödel-Dummett logic, the Visser rules (and hence all admissible rules) are derivable. Here we consider some logics where this does not happen: de Morgan (or Jankov) logic KC, axiomatized by adding the axiom ¬A ∨ ¬¬A to IPC, and the family of logics with Kripke models of bounded cardinality BC n for n = 1, 2, . . . (noting that for the cases n = 1, 2, the Visser rules are in fact derivable). Our treatment of these logics gives a nice illustration of the flexibility of the approach, since to define a calculus for admissibility (and indeed even derivability) in such cases, we require rules dealing with more complicated structures. In particular, we use hypersequents, a natural generalization of sequents introduced by Avron in [1] .
Definition 53 A hypersequent G is a finite multiset of sequents, written
Generalized hypersequent rules are defined in exactly the same way as sequent rules. However, here we will deal only with single-conclusion generalized hypersequent rules:
Definition 54 A generalized hypersequent rule (gh-rule for short) R is an ordered pair of multisets of hypersequents:
where ∆ = {A 1 , . . . , A n }. Using the right set of premises, σ is an L-unifier for
It suffices now to show that σ is an L-unifier for I(G | {Γ ⇒ A} A∈∆ ). Suppose, arguing contrapositively, that this is not the case. Then there exists a countermodel of L for I(σ(G)) ∨ A∈∆ I(σ(Γ) ⇒ σ(A)). This implies that for every A ∈ ∆ there are countermodels
Observe that for all B → C ∈ Γ such that B ∈ Π, either B ∈ ∆ or K σ(B). Note also that B ∈ ∆ implies K σ(B). Hence for all B ∈ Π it follows that K σ(B), and so
In particular, using results from [2] , we obtain:
Corollary 60 GAKC is KC-fitting and GABC n is BC n -fitting for n = 1, 2, . . .. The completeness theorem is then established similarly to the proof for IPC, the main complication being that we now have to take care of all the different disjuncts occurring in hypersequents on the left.
Theorem 62 Let L be an extensible intermediate logic and let GAL be L-fitting.
The right-to-left direction follows directly from Lemma 59. For the left-toright direction, it is sufficient to assume (proceeding exactly as in the IPC-case) that R = G H is an L-admissible implication-irreducible gs-rule that is full with respect to (AC), (→) , and (IV ). Let G = G 1 , . . . , G n and G i = S Now consider a disjunct D = C j i ,...,jn of C for which there is no disjunct D of C such that set(D ) ⊆ set(D) and eq(D ) < eq(D). We have to show that it is IPC-projective. Arguing contrapositively, assume it is not. Then in the same way as in the intuitionistic case, using the claim where we there used Lemma 51, we end up with a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ of C j i ,...,jn such that U (Γ ⇒ ∆, D), where K Γ and ∆ ∩ P = ∅ for K = {p | K p}. Now in the intuitionistic case we conclude that Γ ⇒ A ∈ G for some A ∈ ∆, or Γ Π , Π ⇒ ∆ ∈ H for some Π ⊆ Γ ∆ . Here we want to conclude that either Γ ⇒ A is a conjunct of D for some A ∈ ∆, or H = (Γ Π , Π ⇒ ∆) for some Π ⊆ Γ ∆ . The rest of the argument will then be similar to the intuitionistic case. Therefore, we have proved the theorem once we have proved the following claim. 
Termination
Our final task will be to show that by adding some control to the application of rules, we obtain calculi for admissibility in our logics that are terminating in the sense that applying the rules backwards to any gs-rule or gh-rule terminates. Known decidability results for admissibility in modal and intermediate logics are obtained as corollaries. The basic idea is to apply the invertible left logical rules as much as possible to obtain atomic or implication-irreducible gs-rules or gh-rules, then to apply the remaining non-structural rules with loop-checking.
Definition 64 For R = Definition 65 Let GAL t be GAL where every non-left-logical-rule R is replaced by R + restricted to non-looping applications with an irreducible conclusion.
Intuitively, we are simply ensuring that the left logical rules of the calculus are applied first, and that the other rules add sequents or hypersequents without removing them (this can be achieved by first applying contraction rules). Indeed it is easy to check that these extra restrictions do not interfere with our completeness proofs.
Lemma 66 Let L be an extensible modal logic or an extensible intermediate logic, and let GAL be an L-fitting calculus or GAI if L is IPC. Then:
where if L is an extensible intermediate logic but not IPC, H = ∅ or H is a sequent.
Theorem 67 If GAL is L-fitting or GAI and every non-left-logical-rule has the subformula property, then GAL t is terminating.
Proof. If R is not irreducible, then by invertibility, left logical rules can be applied, terminating with irreducible gs-rules or hs-rules. From this point onwards only nonlooping applications of rules with the subformula property are applied. Observe that there is only a finite number of sequents and non-repetitive hypersequents that can be constructed from subformulas of a given gs-rule or gh-rule R. However, since every rule is non-looping and expansive, each application of a rule adds at least one new sequent or non-repetitive hypersequent. By the preceding observation, this process must terminate. 2
In particular, we have terminating systems for our paradigmatic cases of modal and intermediate logics.
Corollary 68 GAL t is terminating for L ∈ {K4, S4, GL, IPC, KC.BC 1 , BC 2 , . . .}.
Moreover, we know that decidability for derivability implies decidability for admissibility in these cases.
Corollary 69 Admissibility is decidable for any decidable extensible modal logic or extensible intermediate logic.
